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A B S T R A C T 
 
 
This study identifies systematic determinants of some key budgetary aggregates in 
transition and OECD economies. Because of the lack of theory on public 
expenditure, the study is empirical. We use three approaches: regression analysis, 
non-parametric efficiency analysis, and construction of a budget set and a 
preference set. The revealed empirical regularities help to explain a number of 
short-term difficulties of budgetary policy in transition countries, and thus tightens 
the still fragmentary definition of transition. The study also identifies some 
structural challenges for the long-term sustainability of budgetary and policy 
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The study tries to identify patterns of government expenditure and taxation in 
OECD countries, comparing them with those in Central European countries. This 
comparison is made  because the countries of Central europe want to join the 
OECD and the European Union, and because these transition economies have a 
level of development and an economic structure more similar to the rest of Europe 
than to any other group of countries, despite their misleadingly low incomes per 
capita reported at current exchange rates.  
 
The study is empirical, and reference is made to theoretical work wherever 
necessary. Our primary objective is to identify a number of similarities and 
problems in budgetary policy among countries. We will clarify several questions 
that are most relevant to the transition countries.  
 
First, we compare specific data on the transition countries, such as share of state 
pensions and social security expenditures (Sachs, 1995), to those on the OECD 
countries.  This comparison could help to piece together fragmentary definition on 
the transition. The data on budgetary policy at least is not complete, however. The 
legacy of communism can be identified in the poor performance of a small number 
of development indicators, such as large and subsidized state sector, little access to 
tertiary education, and low reliance on indirect taxes for the level of development 
reached. 
 
We also want to identify systematic determinants of some key budgetary 
aggregates. These determinants may have different origins.  Structural 
determinants relate to the age structure of the population, or income per capita, or 
income distribution.  The specific determinants often represent the preferences of a 
country, be they for high pensions, early retirement, or many years of free and 
compulsory education. Systemic determinants define the type of economic system. 
We limited the choice to two: transition economy or OECD economy.   
 
The links between variables that we find to be determinants of the budgetary 
aggregates and performances have some predictive power.  For the OECD 
countries, they show the consequences of policy choices and possible avenues for 
reform or budgetary savings.  For the transition countries, they serve as an 
indicator of what to expect as they near the level of development and of 
preferences of the OECD countries. The analysis also shows the transition 
countries where patience will be needed. For example, health expenditures may 
eventually rise in dollar terms (but not as a share of GDP) if transition countries do B. Fakin & A. de Crombrugghe 
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not find more efficient systems than those in the OECD. Rising health expenditures 
should not be a policy priority as long as incomes per capita cannot support an 
increase and fulfilling income earning needs (such as human capital investment, 
employment opportunities, infrastructure investment) is more pressing.  
 
We want to find the degrees of freedom of budgetary policy, or by how much 
countries can differ and still perform efficiently. First, we must identify the costs 
and benefits of some policies. For instance, the health status of an individual can 
be assessed by using appropriate social indicators.
1  
 
Output indicators, such as infant mortality or life expectancy at birth, measure 
results, impacts, or outputs and can be used to determine the magnitude and the 
nature of health problems. Input and process indicators, on the other hand, can be 
used to identify major factors contributing to health problems. Input indicators, 
such as government expenditures on health, are variables that influence the 
availability of required resources. Process indicators, such as number of hospital 
beds and number of physicians, reflect the availability of needed social services for 
the satisfaction of health needs. For example, with a regression analysis, we can 
show that hospital beds are less productive than physicians, at least for the basic 
output indicators of health, while they are more expensive for the government 
budget. In the second step we identify countries that achieve better results with the 
same or lower amount of input indicators.  
 
We wanted to study a few fiscal determinants of economic growth.  Unfortunately, 
meaningful long-term growth rates are not available for transition countries 
because, the previous system was abandoned and the regime change was too 
recent. The study is static in that it does not directly identify possible sources of 
economic growth. A government may want to experiment. This study will help 
such a government identify how its policies differ from the most interesting 
preference set.  We identify the budget constraint and refer to the literature on 
economic growth to help judge potential policy experiments.  
 
The set of comparisons and empirical regularities that we present should help to 
explain a number of short term difficulties of budgetary policy in transition 
countries. It should also help to identify some structural issues concerning the 
long-term sustainability of budgetary and policy choices.   
 
 
                                           
    
1 Following Cornia (1987) these can be classified into outcome (output), input, and process indicators. 
This conceptual framework was applied to the poverty problems and corresponding social expenditure 
policies in Pleskovic & Sivitanides (1993). Patterns of Government Expenditures and Taxation.... 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
We have chosen three approaches to describe patterns of expenditure and taxation. 
The first is regression analysis, the second is non-parametric efficiency analysis, 
and the third is the construction of a budget set and a preference set.  
 
1. The regression analysis 
 
The regression analysis is organized around four types of explanatory variables. 
They represent different forms of control that the government or the economy 
exercises over the budgetary variables that we want to explain.   
 
a. "Transition dummy" 
 
The first type of variable distinguishes transition economies from other economies 
in our data set. Transition economies are identified by a dummy that takes a value 
of one for the four transition economies and zero otherwise.  A significant 
coefficient on the dummy indicates a real difference in policy, given all the other 
characteristics affecting this aspect of budgetary policy.   
 
We expect the transition-country variable to be significant more often when using 
pre-reform data than when using post-reform data. The comparison of the pre- and 
post-reform data will show what is the short- and long-term specificity of fiscal 
management in transition economies. In this version of the paper we use only 
1992, post-socialist data.  
 
Instead of using a dummy variable we could have analyzed the specificity of 
transition countries on the basis of a projected regression for OECD countries and 
a comparison of the projected and actual dependent variables.  We found this 
approach less attractive than the dummy variable approach to identify 
transition-specific rather than country-specific effects.   
 
When dummy variable is significant across a number of regressions, some 
explanatory power can be found in the repetition. Local policy-makers can identify 
areas where choices will have to be made and  where negotiations may be difficult 
with international organizations. International donors may see where assistance or 
reform is more specifically needed.   
b. "Systemic" variables 
 
The second type of variable tries to identify the economic "system" chosen by the 
economy.  The role of the state in economic activity can vary widely across B. Fakin & A. de Crombrugghe 
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countries.  The idea here is to find a variable that could substitute for the transition-
country dummy and also apply to a number of OECD countries.  Such a variable is 
difficult to identify. Nevertheless, the share of the state in manufacturing output, 
the share of public sector employment in total employment or the share of 
subsidies in value added, share of state pensions or social expenditures in GDP 
may work. Except for subsidies, such data are available for very few countries. 
Also, it is unclear how well such variables truly represent a choice on the 
organization of economic and social life, and not something else, like the capture 
of the government by some groups or the government's desire to buy loyalties 
(Sachs, 1995). In our classification, the variable would then become 
"policy-specific" and fall into the fourth group. It could be still interesting to 
observe significant coefficients for such a variable across a number of regressions. 
If such a variable performs better than the transition country dummy, it would tell 
us that transition countries do face systemic adjustment problems, but they are not 
unique to them.   
 
c. "Structural" variables 
 
The variables of the third type could be called structural or systematic. They 
represent characteristics that are beyond the control of governments at least in the 
short term.  They are different from the first two groups because they do not 
represent a choice of economic system own to an area (the transition dummy) or to 
a type or organization of the economic life (systemic variables). A first group of 
variables of this structural type includes various demographic variables. A young 
population may require more education spending, while an older population may 
need more pensions and health care spending. The demographic variables seem 
pretty exogenous even if child allowances may have a marginal effect on birth 
rates and generous pensions and health care may lengthen life expectancy.   
 
A second structural variable in the short run is GDP per capita. There is a 
significant positive relation between health spending as a share of GDP and 
income per capita across OECD countries. For such a regression, GDP per capita 
can be seen as exogenous, even if in the long run a healthy population should be 
more productive than an unhealthy one. Income per capita measures what a 
country can afford. It distinguishes necessities (goods whose share in expenditure 
declines with higher income) and luxuries (goods share rises). There is also a 
production aspect captured by this income variable, indicating that some services 
where productivity grows slowly tend to absorb a larger share of expenditures 
(especially through wages) in high-income (and high wage) countries than in low-
income countries.  Whether high expenditure share comes from consumption or the 
production side, the conclusion for poor countries is caution with the type of 
expenditures associated with high incomes.   
 Patterns of Government Expenditures and Taxation.... 
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The economic growth literature has found positive relations between the long-term 
growth rate and education, health, and infrastructure and other indicators of the 
stock of human or physical capital.  The indicators are usually performance 
indicators (life expectancy, education rates) rather than expenditure in these areas 
(Barro 1991, Barro & Sala-i- Martin 1995). We relate the components of 
expenditure to the performance indicators in order to see which elements of 
expenditure are most likely to contribute indirectly to growth. As a complement to 
our warning about the expenditure type of high-income countries, this could help 
transition countries identify the savings that are the least harmful to health, 
education, or infrastructure performance.  
 
We have included the degree of monetisation of the economy in the structural 
variables. Our liquidity variable measures the ratio of M2 to GDP (the inverse of 
velocity). Although this variable can be affected by specific policy choices, it can 
also be inherited from past monetary history. It is easy to induce a currency 
substitution. But when a monetary base is destroyed by inflation, it is hard to 
rebuild it as people have learned how to save on money and have lost confidence. 
In a number of advanced countries, the liquidity may depend upon technological 
advances like electronic money, which is quite independent of policies, but in 
others, the government has been able to use monetary repression to finance public 
deficits by forcing banks to maintain high reserve ratios.  
 
Of the structural variables, the degree of inequality deserves special attention.   
Here too, various interpretations are possible. The variable that we found for our 
sample measures the income share of the highest income decile. This variable can 
be interpreted as an ex-post measure of inequality and thus represents the tolerance 
of a country for inequality.   
 
Newbery (1993, 1994) has devoted special attention to the role of inequality in 
budgetary policy. Two of his four determinants of optimum taxation are related to 
inequality.  The tolerance for inequality is represented in his simulations by a 
parameter of the social utility function. Ex-ante measure of skill differences 
(Newbery suggests the pre-tax wage dispersion) could be an input indicator of the 
ex-ante need (and room) for redistribution, other things remaining equal. For a 
regression analysis, we have serious doubts about the reliability (exogeneity) of a 
financial ex-ante indicator of skill differences, although it fits very well into 
Newbery's simulation. A financial indicator can turn out to be just an other ex-post 
output indicator of the acceptance of inequality or of the malfunctioning of the 
labour market.  The last two determinants of Newbery's tax policy are discussed 
below, they are "specific" variables: the required government expenditure (for 
solvability reasons) and the substitution between taxed and non-taxed activities 
(for equity and efficiency reasons).   
 B. Fakin & A. de Crombrugghe 
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d. "Specific" variables 
 
The fourth (and last) type of variables are "specific" variables. Such variables 
represent the countrys' policy choices and could include any variable not 
corresponding to the first three types. Such variables are used as regressors or as 
dependent variables depending upon the regression.  A "policy-specific" variable is 
identified if it enters significantly in a regression. A "country-specific" policy is 
identified if the residual of a country is especially high (in a regression where this 
variable is the dependent variable).   
 
We include here a group of variables that could easily form a fifth group: 
performance variables.  These variables include such indicators as life expectancy 
(health), number of telephone lines (infrastructure), or number of patents 
registered.  We include them here as they can also represent policy choices of a 
country. These variables are also used in the efficiency analysis as performance 
indicators.   
 
e. Interpretation issues 
 
Regression analysis is also useful for identifying the true meaning of a variable.  
The expected sign of the relation between two variables could be opposite or 
insignificant depending upon the definition of one of the variables as an input or 
output, a cause or consequence.   
 
 An example of such a  variable is the inequality variable. A large share of national 
income going to the wealthiest 10 percent of the population could be seen as 
justifying redistributive taxation or as an indicator of the tolerance of society for 
inequality.  If the variable measures after-tax income, it is likely to give the 
society's tolerance for inequality.  This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that 
this share of income enters significantly and repeatedly with a negative sign in 
regressions trying to explain the level of taxation. 
 
Another example is the number of hospital beds per 1000 inhabitants. This figure 
could be interpreted as an intermediate indicator of healthcare performance, or at 
least as an input to healthcare, or simply as a healthcare cost. The fact that hospital 
beds are positively correlated with health costs indicates that the cost interpretation 
is correct.  The fact that they are negatively correlated with infant mortality 
indicates that the input interpretation is also correct.  The fact that they are not 
correlated with life expectancy indicates that the process indicator interpretation is 
incorrect. The conclusion is that hospital bed expenditures have to be carefully 
targeted.   
 Patterns of Government Expenditures and Taxation.... 
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2. Efficiency analysis  
 
We use a basic approach to efficiency. This approach compares a number of 
outputs (government services) with the input cost, which is represented by 
aggregate government expenditure.  This non- parametric cost-efficiency analysis 
has been used in another budgetary context by Eeckaut, Tulkens, and Jamar (1993) 
in a study of Belgian municipalities.   
 
The definition of the outputs is often controversial. For example crime rate is is a 
desirable output of a well-managed society. Now some may claim that this rate is 
just a question of culture, or at least that some governments may inherit quieter 
populations than others. Is the size of the police force a good indicator of 
government services?  It may be large because the government wants to fight crime 
or because it does not fight crime efficiently by other means (schooling, housing, 
and employment programs). In the end, the choice may be dictated by the 
availability of data, and caution will be needed in the interpretation.   
 
The output indicators can find some grounding in the regression analysis.  We have 
not looked for strong correlations between the output indicators and spending 
(input indicator), because we want to show that some countries can offer better 
value for money than others.  We have nevertheless tried to find an output 
indicator for each of the major functional categories of spending we studied in the 
regression analysis.  We have chosen indicators as close as possible to the final 
outcome performance (or need): old-age dependency ratio, inequality, life 
expectancy, infant mortality, university entry, patents, and telephone lines.  
 
The cost-efficiency analysis is based on the concept of domination.  Countries with 
similar per capita (or per GDP) expenditure are grouped.  Their output indicators 
are compared. Dominated countries are countries with lower indicators for all 
outputs and equal or higher expenditure.  
 
Our cost measure is the share of total public expenditure in GDP.  Total public 
expenditure as a share of GDP is a disadvantage to transition economies. In the 
future, we should also try total public expenditure in dollars per capita. Transition 
countries have relatively high shares of spending as a share of GDP (Sachs, 1995), 
but they also inherited a general delay in development, which affects their 
performance, independently of their public spending.  Even so, the analysis is 
interesting for transition countries.  They can identify various Western countries 
that perform better but do not necessarily record the same performance in all B. Fakin & A. de Crombrugghe 
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indicators.
2 This may result from different patterns of public finance development 
and targeting. But again, this should be confronted with the regression analysis to 
see how and when this can be reached.   
 
3. Budget constraint and comparative preferences 
 
The budget constraint and comparative preferences are captured in Figure 1. The 
space is spanned by two goods that the government can provide. The budget 
constraint is the line with a negative slope equal to the relative price of the two 
goods.  The expansion path represents the choices made by other countries. It can 
either be a regression line or it can be an upper-limit line.  
 
 
Figure 1. The Budget Constraint and Comparative Preferences 
 
If a country simultaneously runs a budget deficit and finds itself above the 
expansion path, it should reduce spending on the good measured on the vertical 
axis. If a country runs a budget deficit but finds itself below the expansion line, it 
should reduce spending on the good measured on the horizontal axis. 
 
The majority of our regressions are not run in two-goods space.  We can 
nevertheless draw attention to the residuals. A positive residual for an expenditure 
item shows a potential saving for this country. A negative residual shows a 
potential saving for the other countries. If the performance of the country is 
excellent (it has the highest life expectancy with the lowest health expenditure), it 
identifies a need for savings elsewhere in this country if the performance is weak 
(life expectancy is low for the level of development reached). 
 
                                           
    
2 Sen (1993) for example found that China and Sri Lanka (before the civil war) provided extensive 
health care and educational services but spent very little on health and education. By contrast, many 
countries raised GDPquite rapidly but have not generated resources to advance health and education. Patterns of Government Expenditures and Taxation.... 




3 is divided into four main groups of dependent variables.   
 






Expenditures are further divided into six subgroups:  
-Payrolls  




-Subsidies     
 
The six groups of expenditure analyzed here cross the lines of the usual 
expenditure classifications.  Payrolls clearly belong to the economic classification 
and run across the functional classification.  Health and education clearly belong to 
the functional classification but include a large amount of wages and some 
investment.   
 
The choice of these six items in government expenditure shoul, however, not be 
surprising.  Each item is a major element of spending in its classification, and can 
possibly crowd out the others.  Each item is also the object of much debate and 
represents well-defined policy options.  Except possibly for payrolls and subsidies, 
performance indicators can be clearly identified.  Finally, the items cover the 
distributional and the public good provision role of the government. The third 
classical role of a government in a market economy (according to Musgrave), 
providing stability, is covered in the analysis of the aggregates.  
                                           
    
3 A NOTE ON THE REGRESSION TABLES 
The tables always contain the following information: 
Equations are in columns, when necessary the dependent variable is recalled on top of the column. 
R
2 is the determination coefficient. 
T-statistics are in parentheses, significance levels are indicated as follows ** < 1%, * < 5%, + < 10 
percent.  
Missing observations are explicitly named for transition countries only.  
Residuals are given for transition countries when they exceed the one-standard-deviation band.  
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Taxes and expenditures can be normalized as comparable dollars per capita, share 
of GDP, or share of total public expenditure. We choose the last two, mainly for 
simplicity. There can be significant differences between the share of GDP and the 
share of total spending of a budgetary item. This difference mainly depends on the 
share of total spending in GDP.  In addition, one can expect that the priorities of a 
country will be reflected more clearly in the analysis of the budgetary share of a 
spending item than in the GDP share.   
 
1. Aggregates  
 
 The study of the aggregates revolves around the size of government redistribution 
(the share of expenditure or revenue in GDP), the financial management (budget 
deficits and debts) and the growth or income performance. The regression results 
are presented in Tables 1, 2 and 3.   
 
a. The size of public redistribution 
 
The size of the redistribution taking place in socialist countries seemed strikingly 
large before 1989.  It has been reduced since then by large cuts in subsidies and 
budgeted transfers among state enterprises. The "systemic" dummy variable is 
expected to be significant before 1989 and to vanish after 1989.  The inheritance 
from the past could still have been visible in the dummy variable once other 
determinants of the size of the governments are taken into account, but in our 
regressions presented in Table 1, the transition countries do not seem to spend 
more than OECD countries with similar shares of retirees or levels of income and 
inequality.   
 
The in-significance of the transition dummy, despite a high share of expenditure in 
GDP, may be mainly due to the relatively egalitarian income distribution achieved 
by the transition countries. Of the OECD countries, the egalitarian countries are 
also the largest spenders.   
 
A high income per capita (GDPHS) is expected to enable a country to raise taxes 
efficiently and maintain a big government. This is certainly true when one 
compares developing countries with OECD countries, but the relation seems weak 
(or non-linear) in our sample. 
 Patterns of Government Expenditures and Taxation.... 
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A low old-age demographic dependency ratio (DDO: working age  population 
divided by the number of people aged 65 and above), is expected to raise both 
pension and health expenditure needs, especially when the proportion of old people 
is high.  A young population may require important education expenditures (DDY : 
young demographic dependency ratio or TDDO: total demographic dependency 
ratio). Good performance of the specific variable called actual dependency ratio 
(ADR: number of pensioners divided by the number of employees), which also 
includes early retirees, would indicate that early retirement could be one of the 
reasons for excess pension expenditures. 
 
The variable measuring inequality (INEQUAL: share of income of the highest 
decile in total income) may indicate the tolerance of a country for inequality.  If so, 
such tolerance is expected to have a negative effect on the size of the redistribution 
undertaken by the government. This is confirmed by our regressions (Table 1).The 
variable was also remarkably stable and significant in a number of non-reported 
regressions.  
 
Some specific variables pulling expenditure upward could also be identified, either 
in the regression analysis or by looking at the residuals of a base regression.  A 
policy-specific variable is identified if it enters significantly in the regression 
analysis of aggregate expenditure.  A significant policy-specific variable is the 
share of government employment in total employment (GLABOUR): huge 
payrolls systematically drive expenditure upwards.  Another important specific 
variable is pensions. The actual number of retirees per employee (ADR) seems to 
raise total expenditure. The ease of early retirement, measured by the number of 
retirees divided by the number of people aged 65 and above (ADRDDO) seems to 
raise expenditure as well. These results could indicate the additional burden on the 
budget of early retirement.  
 
The positive relation of debt and total expenditure could be expected for two 
reasons.  If expenditure includes debt service, a huge debt raises this part of 
expenditure.  If the accumulated debt indicates the continuing inability of a country 
to master its spending, then the positive correlation can also be expected. 
 
More surprising is the negative relation between the share of government 
investment in total spending (GINVEXP) and total spending as a share of GDP.  
The relation is consistent with other observations in Table 1. Government 
investment is associated with low income and deficit finance.  Our hypothesis is 
that investment is of the "catch up" type and takes place in relatively poor countries 
that can avoid to overburdening their economies with high taxes, and which enjoy 
financial credibility.
4  
                                           
    
4 This was the case of the South-Korean development success. B. Fakin & A. de Crombrugghe 
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We expected that countries that rely primarily on indirect taxes will be able to 
redistribute less income.  We see below that in fact such countries tolerate more 
inequality. Apparently, the regressions show that indirect taxes, by boosting 
income, boost expenditure. Theyy are thus a non-negligible source of revenue!  
Here we should nevertheless note that the revenue explanation of the size of the 
government turned out to perform poorly when combined with specific 
expenditure aspects. 
 
The revenue regressions in Table 1 differ slightly from the expenditure ones.   
Theoretically, the difference is the budget deficit. This explanation may find some 
confirmation (investment regressions) in the link between government investment 
and deficit finance. Simultaneity need not be the case in all countries and some 
noise or lags may also affect the relations. The non-linear relation of revenue in 
GDP with GDP per capita should not be a surprise: it says that very rich countries 
will not redistribute 100 percent of GDP through government expenditure.   
 
We tend to prefer the first and fourth expenditure regression (driven by specific 
items) and the second revenue regression (driven by the natural logarthim of GDP 
at purchasing power parity and by the share of indirect tax revenue in total public 
spending). We would like to draw the attention of policy makers to the risks that a 
large payroll and generous retirement policy represent for expenditure 
management. Marginal significance of the replacement rate (SOCWAGE: the share 
of social transfers from the government budget in wages) indicates that some 
pensions are most likely too high, rather than that there are too many pensioners. 
The demographic aspect (DDO) is not significant. Thus having an old population 
does not necessarily raise government expenditures. To draw a definite conclusion, 
we must also look at at the pension and social transfers regressions. 
 
Finally, the residuals indicate a tendency of Slovenia and Poland to overspend, 
while Hungary could possibly raise even more revenue by increasing indirect 
taxation. 
 
b. Financial management (deficits and debts) 
 
High budget deficits and external debts need not be a characteristic of socialist 
countries.  The socialist experiences of Poland and Hungary or of Romania and 
Russia (all highly indebted) differ from the Czech Republic (low debt, low recent 
deficits). We do not expect our transition dummy to be significant.  If we could 
find a good indicator of the degree of control of the central planner on the 
economy, it would probably be negatively correlated with the indebtedness of a 
socialist country, but it would be of little significance for comparison with OECD Patterns of Government Expenditures and Taxation.... 
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countries. We then turn to structural and specific variables. Table 2 gives the 
regression results.  
Of the structural variables, we used variables linked with the affordability of a 
borrowing policy: a high income per capita, relatively deep financial markets 
(proxied by LIQUID: the ratio of M2 to GDP).  It turns out (see the first and 
second equation in Table 2) out that liquidity is the only structural variable with a 
significant effect on the budget deficit: a positive effect, as expected. Inequality 
(INEQUAL) was also expected to raise budget deficits, but this is not confirmed in 
our sample and using our methodology.
5  
 
Of the policy-specific variables, we expected that the government payroll and 
pensions would be hard to compress and to lead to recurrent deficits. For our data 
sample, the governments' share of employment (GLABOUR) is not significant, as 
illustrated by the second regression in Table 2. At least in its form of actual 
number of retirees per employed person, ADR also turned out to be insignificant. 
In the future it could be interesting to determine whether the quantities (ratio of 
effective to demographic dependency, share of government employment in total 
employment) are more or less significant than the volume variables (wage 
expenditure, pension expenditure).  
 
Table 2 also shows the negative coefficient of the Debt/GDP ratio, indicating 
stronger deficit reduction efforts in highly indebted countries.  This trend has also 
been observed by Martin & Oxley (1991) for the OECD countries. 
 
We include a regression analysis of the "misery index" (MISERY: the sum of the 
unemployment and inflation rates). We find thet liquidity and the natural logarithm 
of GDP at purchasing power parity were determinants of the misery index: 
financially stable and rich countries manage to have lower inflation and lower 
unemployment. Some inequality returns (in the third regression in Table 2): social 
conflict produces inflation and unemployment. The share of government 
employees in total employment is not too costly provided that the country is rich 
and financially credible otherwise. 
 
We have not found that the debt-to-GDP ratio contributed significantly to the 
misery index. What we have found is that a country tries to go back to a more 
virtuous path by reducing its deficit.   
                                           
    
5 A number of studies have already been conducted on budget deficits and social conflict.  Roubini and 
Sachs (1989) have shown that coalition governments were more prone to deficits than homogenous 
governments.  Berg and Sachs (1988) have identified a number of determinants of high indebtedness 
including the degree of inequality, income per capita, the trade regime, and regional variables.  More 
recently, Alesina (1994) observed a negative correlation between successful stabilization attempts and the 
persistence of high social expenditures. 
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Table 2 also shows that liquidity is positive and significant in budget deficit 
regressions and negative and significant in misery regressions. A highly monetized 
economy can afford a larger deficit and a lower misery index because of its large 
borrowing possibilities (see also Sachs 1994, Sachs & Zini 1994). 
 
c. GDP per capita 
 
Our last aggregate variable is income per capita.  We are aware of the existence of 
an extensive literature on comparisons of income per capita and growth rates 
across countries.  Our purpose here is limited to analyzing elements of budgetary 
policy that are correlated with income per capita.   
 
In the analysis of expenditure components like health and education, we will see 
that income per capita is a systematic determinant of the size of these labor 
intensive and costly services.  In the analysis of GDP per capita, we want to see if 
one component of expenditure adds something to national income, given that the 
others are already in the regression.   
 
We also expect the socialist system to have produced a relatively low income per 
capita given the other services it provided (such as high unemployment 
compensation and high state pensions). The dummy variable is expected to be 
significant in a regression based on dollar income rather than purchasing power 
parities (GDPHS), reflecting the anti-service and anti-trade bias of the former 
system.  For the income at purchasing power parity, the dummy is insignificant.  
The socialist countries share with some of the poor OECD countries poor 
performance in services, health, and infrastructure provision which explains their 
low income per capita.
6 This indirectly justifies the use of the Heston-Summers 
methodology to compute purchasing power parity incomes.  
 
Our regressions are based on the level of income per capita rather than  growth 
rates
7. It is difficult to find meaningful growth rates for Central Europe and to 
                                           
    
6 However, as illustrated by the case of Sweeden, good performance in social service indicators does 
not lower GDP per capita. 
    
7 The results of other studies of long-term growth rates for different sets of countries can be 
summarized as follows.  The most significant variable seems to be the extent of primary or secondary 
education at the start of the reference period (Barro 1991, Barro & Sala-i-Martin 1995).  Health is often 
significant too.  The income level at the start of the reference period. This result is often negatively 
correlated with subsequent growth, provided other variables (education) are included in the regression. 
This result indicates that catch-up is possible if the right means are used.  More debatable is the role of 
physical investment, although Delong and Summers (1991) have provided some evidence of its 
importance. Patterns of Government Expenditures and Taxation.... 
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define a meaningful period of reference. Table 3 gives the growth or income 
performance regressions for our sample. 
 
For our country sample INVGDP was negatively correlated with income per 
capita. This is demonstrated by the third regression in Table 3, but is to be 
interpreted with caution.  The catch-up by poor countries may be attributable to 
large investments.  Nevertheless, it is also possible that some of this investment is 
actually a waste of resources.  Given the association of the share of government 
investment in public spending with low aggregate public spending (see aggregate 
expenditure regressions in Table 1) and with deficit finance (see investment 





We concentrate on the two types of taxes whose change in Eastern Europe has 
been most visible: Indirect and corporate taxes.  Indirect taxes have been 
completely overhauled with the introduction of the VAT and the reform of the 
import tariffs.  Corporate Income Taxes have seen their importance decline. Social 
Security Contributions have risen somewhat, and personal income taxes have been 
introduced to replace wage taxes and to cover more than labour income.  Personal 
Income taxes are being considered as residual income once the analysis of indirect 
and corporate taxes is done and social security taxes are taken as given.   
 
Advanced countries finance their spending mainly through direct and indirect 
taxes.  Some developing countries rely heavily on import tariffs and possibly on 
royalties from natural resources. Burgess and Stern (1993) presented these taxation 
patterns in a triangle whose vertices are (from left to right) direct taxes, indirect 
taxes and trade taxes.  It is probably more interesting for advanced countries to 
redefine the triangle.  Trade taxes would be added to indirect taxes on the upper 
point, the left point would measure social security taxes, while the right point 
would be limited to the sum of personal and corporate income taxes.  The Western 
tradition treats corporate income partly as personal income and uses progressivity 
primarily for personal income taxes. Social security contributions are (or were) 
levied at flat, if not regressive (in the United States), rates, justified by the return or 
insurance principle. 
 
If we look at Figure 2 we can compare the Slovene country point with those for 
Transition and OECD country averages. Indirect taxes represent 33.4% of tax 
revenue in Slovenia, 6.5 percentage points less than the transition country average 
                                           
    
8 We also found government investment (GINVEXP) to be negatively correlated with total expenditure 
in the first and the fourth regression in Table 1 and with income per capita in the the third regression in 
Table 3. B. Fakin & A. de Crombrugghe 
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and 1.6 percentage points less than OECD country average. Social security 
contributions generate half of total tax income in Slovenia, while transition and 
OECD averages amount respectively to only 37.1%  and 26.1%. Indirect taxes in 
Slovenia are low, with a share of 16.6% only, 6.4 percentage points less than 





  Figure 2. The Tax Triangle 
 
a. Indirect taxes  
 
As can be observed from Table 4, we didn't get significant results for the transition 
DUMMY, although we expected that Central European countries' indirect taxes 
were too low. This could be because there are still (after the VAT) unexploited 
possibilities of indirect taxation) or because (some of) transition countries finance 
high expenditures by increasing foreign debt rather than increasing taxes, or both. 
 
Interestingly, as documented by the first regression, inequality explains only the 
share of indirect taxes in total taxes, not its share in GDP.  Inequality, on the other 
hand, tends to reduce the total amount of taxes in GDP (see above, aggregate 
expenditure regressions in Table 1). The two observations are consistent. The 
dummy is insignificant. After the reform of turnover taxes and the introduction of 
the VAT, the transition effect seems to be fully captured by low GDP. 
 Patterns of Government Expenditures and Taxation.... 




Income per capita (GDPHS) reduces the share of indirect taxes to the benefit of 
direct taxes. It reduces social security contributions less often. Burgess and Stern 
(1993) have also noted the importance of direct taxes in rich countries.  The rich 
countries of Western Europe are currently looking for ways to reduce social 
security contributions and to raise indirect taxes.  
 
b. Corporate income taxes 
 
As for indirect taxes, it is indeed useful to distinguish their share in GDP and their 
share in total taxes. Table 5 reports regressions for gross corporate taxes as a share 
of revenue.   
 
The share of state enterprises in total output (STATEQ) has a positive effect on 
corporate taxes as a share of total taxes (CTAXREV). The role of the dummy is 
unclear: its negative sign probably compensates for the very high share of state 
firms in total output in transition countries. The negative residual in first regression 
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a. Labour expenditure and payrolls  
 
Labour expenditure is an economic category, not a functional category.  The 
variable is interesting to study. It is often feared that labour expenditure will crowd 
out goods and services, either in years where the government has to reduce its 
spending or because wages would be raised by a relative price effect not 
compensated by increased productivity.  
 
The government's payroll swelled because of the number of people on it or because 
of the wages they earn. We examined each separately. The regression results are 
given in Table 6. 
 
The large share of government employment in total employment (GLABOUR) 
seems hard to explain, possibly because it is usually small and may cover different 
parts of education and health across countries.  Economies of scale seem to be the 
only clear factor: a larger population is correlated with a smaller number of people 
per capita on the government payroll (not reported in the tables).  We also know 
from the aggregate government expenditure regressions (Table 1) that a higher 
share of government employment in total employment could explain higher Patterns of Government Expenditures and Taxation.... 
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expenditures, but we know from the budget deficit regressions that this does not 




If we look at the third regression, wage expenditure as a share of total spending 
(WAGESEXP) is negatively correlated with GDP per capita in current dollars. For 
our data sample, the hypothesis of a "relative price effect" made by Martin and 
Oxley (1991) cannot be confirmed.  
 
Would the negative correlation of wage expenditures with transfer expenditures 
indicate some substitution? Unfortunately we do not see the effect clearly. 
 
A regression where wage expenditure seem to rise with the number of teachers in 
the total population (but less clearly with the ratio of teachers per student, it may 
then be an effect of the number of students) is not reported here. Our results on 
education below add little information, except a possible positive effect of income 
per capita.  
 
We also study state employment, i.e. employment in state firms as a share of total 
employment (STATEL).  The data come from Milanovic (1989) and are available 
for a limited number of countries. If we look at the first and second regression in 
Table 6 we note the negative relation with GDP and the positive relation with 
government investment (GINVGDP). The catch-up hypothesis is not rejected. B. Fakin & A. de Crombrugghe 
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However, the contribution of state employment and of government investment to 
growth can be debated as the transition countries have chosen to rely more on the 
private sector.  A shift of resources towards R&D and investments in human 
capital may be needed as the economy becomes more sophisticated and service-
oriented (see GDP regressions in Table 3 and investment regressions in Table 9).  
 
b. Pension expenditure, effective dependency ratios 
 
We have also studied pension expenditure as a share of GDP (PENSION), social 
transfers in percent of GDP (SOCGDP), and actual dependency ratios (ADR). The 
regression results are presented in Table 7 below. 
 
Demographics (DDO) are not significant in the pension regression (see also 
EXPGDP regressions in Table 1), confirming that having an old population does 
not necessarily raise pension expenditures. A highly significant DDO in the 
regression for social transfers as a share of GDP (SOCGDP) may be due to the 
high share of wages in GDP cost structure. It may help to substitute SOCGDP with 
the share of social transfers in total government expenditures.  
 
The actual dependency ratio (ADR) is marginally significant or insignificant. It 
indicates that early retirement is not always a reason for excess pension 
expenditures. 
 
In the SOCWAGE regression, the transition DUMMY is very significant, but this 
may be because of different data sources for transition and OECD countries.
9  
 
Poland and Slovenia have the highest replacement rate (SOCWAGE), i.e. 74% and 
85% respective, in the sample. If we look at Table 7, the DUMMY and the 
residuals for Poland and Slovenia mean that given their very high replacement 
rates, the transition countries have less pensioners than the OECD countries would 
have. However, a negative DUMMY does not mean that there is room for a higher 
actual ratio ofpensioners to employee (ADR) in transition countries. Certainly not 
as long as there is a budget deficit, underutilized indirect taxes, and 
underdeveloped tertiary education. We also found the old-age demographic ratio to 
be significant significant in ADR regressions.   
 
                                           
    
9 We used Fox's (1994) data for Central Europe and national accounts data for the OECD. Patterns of Government Expenditures and Taxation.... 
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c. Health expenditure     
 
There is a strong positive correlation between health expenditure per capita and 
income per capita; the relation is well-documented for the OECD countries (OECD 
1992). The explanation is that rich countries can afford more sophisticated health 
systems and that rich people are ready to pay more for healthcare. Moreover, 
health may be labour intensive and the relative price of labour is higher in rich 
countries (see also Martin & Oxley 1991).  
 
The greater human capital may contribute positively to its income per capita or to 
its growth.
10  We saw the positive link between life expectancy and the GDP level 
in our GDP regressions in Table 3 (although research and infrastructure mattered 
possibly even more).  The health performance of a country, as measured by infant 
mortality, and to a lesser extent, life expectancy is related to its expenditures on 
health.  There will then be voices to ask for more health expenditures as a way to 
grow faster.  We want to identify the part of health expenditures that contribute 
most to health as measured by life expectancy and those that contribute most to 
health spending.   
 
In health systems there are three main variables that could be more relevant than a 
dummy: national health services (centralized insurance and provision, as in Britain, 
with low cost and low performance), social pooling (ce ntralized or compulsory 
insurance, but more or less free provision as in Holland, Germany, and France with 
medium cost and good performance), private market systems (as in the United 
States, with high cost and unequal performance, depending upon people's 
purchasing power). A transition dummy, as expected, does not explain the share of 
GDP or expenditures going to health, even if most transition countries have 
systems closer to the British type and plan to move away from it.  
 
The systematic determinant of health expenditures is GDP per capita (see the first 
regression in Table 8).  Nevertheless, demographics could also play a role: older 
populations may need more health services. 
 
We can identify a number of specific determinants of health expenditures: doctors, 
personnel, and hospital beds. Health performance, especially infant mortality, may 
be affected by the level of education of the population.
11  It would be interesting to 
test this hypothesis for the advanced countries in our sample.  
 
 
                                           
    
10 There is some evidence of it in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). 
    
11 Forward (output) linkages between education and life expectancy exists in developing countries. 
(Pleskovic and Sivitanides, 1993). Patterns of Government Expenditures and Taxation.... 




The share of health expenditures in GDP is positively correlated with any measure 
of GDP per capita (there may be a demand and a relative price effect working in 
the same direction).  This is a stronger result than the one in OECD (1992), where 
the positive correlation was between PPP dollars of health expenditure per capita 
and income per capita.  
 
The positive relation with GDP per capita disappears for health expenditure as a 
share of total expenditure (HEALTHEX). The second regression in Table 8 shows 
a positive correlation with inequality, while there is a negative correlation between 
total expenditure and inequality (see Table 1). Does this suggest that government 
health expenditures mainly help the rich?  There is also a positive relation with 
unemployment (UNEMPLOY) which would suggest the oposite. This issue 
remains unresolved. The number of doctors (DOCTORS) doesn't affect the share 
of health spending in the budget, but the number of hospital beds (HBEDS) does.  
Old-age dependency was also insignificant in the regression, while we would have 
expected that a larger number of old people would require more medical attention.  
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d. Education 
 
In the regressions we found nothing significant, except possibly a slight positive 
correlation between the share of education expenditures in total expenditures and 
the income per capita. This would indicate that the demand or the relative price of 
education tends to rise with GDP. 
 
For education, as for health, an analysis of costs and performance could be useful.  
The relation between education and economic growth is probably even stronger 
than the relation  between health and economic growth.  The relation between 
education expenditures and income per capita may be a bit weaker than the relation 
between health expenditures and income per capita.  If this is true, poor countries, 
if they want to overspend, would be better advised to do it on education than on 
health, so because seems to be a positive relation between primary education and 
health. Education and health are labour intensive and may record less productivity 
gains than health, so it may absorb a larger income share in rich countries.   
Education is sometimes seen as a luxury in that longer studies in rich countries 
only marginally contribute to labour productivity, but higher education may also be 
used as a signal to screen entrants to the labour market and thus produce indirect 
productivity gains.   
 
We proceed for education as for health and look at costs and performance.   
Unfortunately, it is harder to identify a good performance indicator for education.  
We tried entry at the university as a performance indicator of the primary and 
secondary systems.  We tried R&D and patents as an indicator of higher 
educational performance.  
 
Systemic variables are the usual dummies for transition countries.  We expect 
transition countries to have a lower rate of university entry than they could have.  
If this is true and if university education is really "productive", it indicates an area 
where foreign assistance would be well advised to concentrate, possibly also 




If we look at the first and second regression in the table 9, it follows that the 
budget deficit (BDGDP) is positively correlated with the share of government 
investment in total spending (GINVEXP) and negatively correlated with the share 
of expenditure (EXPGDP). This confirms the catch-up hypothesis (see also 
interpretations of Tables 1 and 3). 
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The different behaviour of the GINV and the GRAD variables confirms the fact 
that the GINV variables are correlated with poor countries, and GRAD variables 
with rich countries. There could thus be a progressive shift from the first to the 





A strong correlation between subsidies and the share of output produced by state 
enterprises can be observed.  The T- statistic is 5.38, and the R
2 is 67.4 on 16 
observations, including the 4 transition countries.  
 
Given very high state employment, transition countries have relatively low 
corporate tax revenue. This is especially true for Slovenia. Transition economies 
certainly had to reform tax systems if they want to privatize. It seems that the state 
employment doesn't produce much for the owner (see negative DUMMY in 






Regressions for patents are inconclusive. Variables that show potential 
performance are RADGDP, RESEARCH (number of researchers per worker), and 
GDP itself. Regression results are given in Table 10 below.   
 B. Fakin & A. de Crombrugghe 
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The RADGDP regression is interesting if we can show a positive correlation with 
patents or another indicator of performance. 
 
It seems that education expenditure is negatively correlated with research 
expenditure.  The question is whether this a desirable substitution. 
 
b. Tertiary Education 
 
Our regressions (see Table 11) confirm that the transition countries have 
underprovided access to higher education, even when we take their relatively low 
GDP per capita into account.  
 
c. Infrastructure  
 
Infrastructure regressions are inconclusive. 
 
d. Life expectancy and other output indicators of health 
performance 
 
Once per capita income is taken into account, health spending as a share of total 
expenditure is significant for life expectancy (see the first and second regression in 
Table 12). The number of doctors is marginally significant. The hospital beds turn 
out to be insignificant. 
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For infant mortality (third regression in Table 12), the main determinant may well 
be GDP in dollars, showing that it is much harder to reduce the risks there. The 
respective role of health expenditures and number of doctors per capita is harder to 
determine. Medical infrastructure may indeed play a larger role once its 




We followed the cost-efficiency approach of Vanden Eeckaut, Tulkens and Jamar 
(1993).  We first ranked all countries in the sample according to the share of their 
public expenditures in GDP; this is our cost indicator.   
 
Next, we choose six output or performance indicators.   
 
-  Patents.  The number of patent applications per 100.000 inhabitants, as a 
measure of technological advancement.  The division by the number of inhabitants 
makes it an acceptable indicator for small countries too. Source: OECD in Figures, 
Supplement to the OECD Observer, No.188,June/July 1994, pp.56-57, and 
National Statistical Yearbooks for Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, Ministry 
of    Science and Technology for Slovenia.   
 
- University entry.  Percentage of the age group beginning tertiary education, as a 
measure of the performance of the primary and secondary education and as a 
measure of the effort to accumulate human capital. Source: World Development 
Report, The World Bank 1994, pp.216-217. 
 
-  Infant mortality per 1000 live births.  This is an output indicator of the 
performance of the health system. For advanced countries it is a more demanding 
measure than life expectancy. Source: World Development Report, The World 
Bank 1994, pp.214- 215. 
 
- Life expectancy at birth.  This is also an output indicator of the performance of 
the health system.  It is strongly  correlated with the infant mortality rate.  It is 
often used as a measure of human development (United Nations). Source: World 
Development Report, The World Bank 1994, pp.162- 163. 
 
- Old Age Demographic Dependency Ratio is defined as a ratio of the working 
age population (15-64 incl.) to the number of old people (65 and older). This 
indicator measures the burden of pensions and health care for the elderly, which is 
usually supported by some form of state intervention.  We did not want to use the 
actual dependency ratio, as this is a self-inflicted burden.  
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-  Telephone main lines per 1000 persons.  This appeared to us as a good 
indicator of modern infrastructure.  We know from our regressions that public 
investment is not necessarily positively correlated with GDP per capita, while 
telephones are.  Infrastructure is partly a state responsibility insofar as it includes 
important positive externalities. Source: World Development Report, The World 
Bank 1994, pp.224-225. 
    
Thus, of our six performance indicators, two are actually substitutes: infant 
mortality and life expectancy both measure health performance.  This redundancy 
has very little effect on the analysis.  
 
Cost efficiency is reached if it is impossible to find a country that spends less and 
performs better or as well in all performance indicators.   
 
Cost inefficiency exists, if there is a country that spends less and performs better or 
as well in all indicators.  The better performing country is called by Tulkens (1993) 
"dominating".  If many countries perform better, the "most dominating" country is 
the one that has the lowest 
expenditure.   
 
The degree of inefficiency is measured as the ratio of the expenditure of the 
dominating country to the expenditure of the inefficient country.  
   
It is interesting to compare an inefficient country with a dominating country to see 
where performance could be improved.  If there are many dominating countries, 
various options of performance improvement may be available.  The dominating 
countries which are in turn dominated by other countries should be eliminated as 
comparators.  The "most dominating" country is not necessarily the reference that 
an inefficient country should choose.  The "most dominating" country is 
determined only in terms of costs.  Some countries that spend more but are still 
efficient may offer a more attractive performance mix.  
 
In table 13 we list of inefficient countries, their expenditure, and the degree of 
inefficiency with each of the "dominating" countries.  
 
We will not dwell on Belgium, Italy, Greece and Portugal, which are all members 
of the European Union. Belgium, Italy, and Greece are well-known overspenders, 
whose deficit problems are linked to political problems. Greece and Portugal are 
notoriously poor.  The domination of Belgium by Norway is only marginal, and 
one can argue that Norway is an homogenous country, unlike Belgium, blessed 
with oil revenues, which make tax perception less distortionary, and thus enables 
Norway to perform better with marginally less spending.  For Italy we do not seem 
to have a reliable number of patents, but the fact that Austria outperforms countries B. Fakin & A. de Crombrugghe 
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like France, Canada, and Spain in patents may well place it above Italy in this 
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The situation of Turkey, a member of the OECD, is peculiar. It underperforms all 
countries in all indicators, except telephones where Poland and Hungary fare 
worse.  Turkey, however, has the lowest expenditure share of GDP, which places it 
among the cost-efficient countries.   
 
The situation of the transition countries is disappointing. On the expenditure side, 
one can claim that the GDP is understated, thus overstating expenditure. In 
addition, one can claim that a comparison of dollars per capita expenditure instead 
of expenditure share of GDP would be more favourable to the transition countries 
(they would seem to spend less).   
 
For patents, from worst to best, we find Poland, Portugal, the Czech Republic, 
Greece, Hungary, Spain, and Slovenia (leaving out Turkey and Italy, for which we 
do not have observations).   
 
For tertiary education, Hungary is at the bottom with Turkey at 15 percent 
enrollment followed by the Czech Republic (16 percent), Poland (22), and 
Portugal, Greece, and Slovenia (27 percent).   
   
For telephones, Poland is at the bottom, followed by Hungary, Turkey, Portugal, 
Slovenia (which has 3 times as many lines per inhabitant as Poland), Ireland, and 
the Czech Republic.   
 
The situation for life expectancy is also dramatic. Turkey is the lowest at 67 years, 
followed by Hungary (69), Poland (70), The Czech Republic (72), and Slovenia 
(73). Infant mortality is a bit less disappointing for Slovenia (8, less than several 
OECD countries) while the others (except Turkey) have poorer performances.   
 
A major difference appears in the old-age dependency ratios. Poland and Slovenia 
have very young populations, while the Czech Republic ranks 10th and Hungary 
12th. The Netherlands is younger, Finland older, and the USA in between. 
Contrary to common wisdom (Kolodko, G., Rzeczpospolita, 23.may, 1994), the 
problems with pension spending in Slovenia and Poland seem largely because of 
high average pension/wage replacement rates, and not primarily to the excessive 
number of early retirees (see regression analysis of pensions). 
 
It is likely that the addition of other performance criteria could change some of the 
comparisons.  An additional indicator could be inequality.  The variable used in 
our regressions appears more as an indicator of the preferences of a country - less 
taxation if inequality is high - than as an objective - more redistribution if 
inequality is high. Nevertheless we suspect that the position of the four transition 
countries would be improved: their high expenditure shares could help maintain a 
more egalitarian B. Fakin & A. de Crombrugghe 
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society.   
In egalitarianism, Hungary and Poland are topped only by Sweden. But they have 
equal amounts of poverty. Belgium is also bousted against Norway when we look 
at the share of income of the poorest 40 percent, but not when we look at the 
richest 10 percent (which is less important). The jury is out for the Czech Republic, 
Greece, and Portugal for which we do not have data. Not-too-egalitarian Italy 
cannot be compared with Austria, which data is missing. Slovenia seems to help its 
poorest 40 percent but gives more to its richest 10 percent than Japan, Australia, 
Germany, Canada, and France.   
 
Another additional indicator could be unemployment rate. We do not think, 
however, that a low rate is necessarily consequence of judicious public spending or 
that a high rate requires more spending.  We see the unemployment rate as mainly 
determined by labour market institutions.  Introducing this indicator would have 
helped the Czech Republic, but it would still be dominated by Switzerland.  Spain 
would no longer dominate any country. 
 
We would still like to consider two performance criteria. One would measure the 
quality of the environment, and the second would measure the number of people 
below the poverty line. But we have not get found appropriate data.  
 
Our analysis can be distinguished from the Human Development Index computed 
in the "Human Development Report" of the United Nations Development 
Programme, in two respects: we do not weigh the indicators, but we compare 
performance against its costs.  We intend to reproduce our cost efficiency analysis 
on the performance indicators of the Human Development Index. 
 
Among the dominating countries that could raise limited enthusiasm in Central 
Europe, are a number of non-European, low-spending, young-population countries. 
Our data show a high infant mortality in the United States (9 per 1000 live births) 
compared with Slovenia (8). Life expectancy in the United States is only slightly 
above average (77). The United States does not dominate Hungary because of its 
younger population. 
 
The poor performance of Spain in patents and telephones and (outside our list) 
employment makes it an unattractive comparator in the long run.  The 
Scandinavian countries are not dominating because they all spend more, as do 
Belgium and the Netherlands, and because they have old populations.  The socialist 
management of all these countries is currently under reform or criticism: this has 
proved to be extremely expensive and has produced very slow growth.   
 
It is not surprising that Germany and Austria have attracted so many immigrants 
given our cost-efficiency analysis.  We are not sure, however, that Central Europe Patterns of Government Expenditures and Taxation.... 
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can reproduce the civil organization and social consensus that made these countries 
successful. We are also not sure that corporate pressures and extremism will not 
threaten Germany's and Austria's performance. Switzerland is also a consensus-
country, but it has a decentralized structure, much lower taxes, and higher 
standards of living. France and USA could be attractive to Poland attraction for 




If were to draw a convergence path for the transition economies it would appear as 
follows: 
 
•  State ownership should continue to be reduced, and possibly state-firm 
employment (if productivity is low). We would call for increased infrastructure 
equipment, which would allow for increased investment in R&D. 
Simultaneously, enrollment in higher education would have to be increased. 
   
•  Pensions would have to be kept low and received late. Dispersion of retirement 
ages and benefits should be reduced for pensions financed by the government on 
a pay-as-you-go basis. Similarly, health costs should be kept in check, especially 
by being cautious with health equipment. If anything, physicians should be 
given priority. A rise in health expenditure should be expected. 
 
•  Deficit finance should be limited to part of the infrastructure equipment.   
Inflation should be reduced to raise the liquidity and lending capacity of the 
economy. Indirect taxes should finance spending as much as possible.  In 
general, taxes should be spread as evenly as possible, but the aggregate tax 
cannot be raised.  The transition countries still redistribute too much of their 
GDP through the government. 
 
•  Rapid efficiency gains from infrastructure improvements, higher education, 
financial development, and international openness should be expected. The gains 
could easily translate into fiscal revenue if the appropriate tax system is in place 
and is correctly enforced. Transition countries must make sure that increased 
demand from a richer population for health and pensions is kept in check and 
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